There\u27s No  I  in  League : Professional Sports Leagues and the Single Entity Defense by Grow, Nathaniel
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 105 Issue 1 
2006 
There's No "I" in "League": Professional Sports Leagues and the 
Single Entity Defense 
Nathaniel Grow 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Courts Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and 
Sports Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nathaniel Grow, There's No "I" in "League": Professional Sports Leagues and the Single Entity Defense, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 183 (2006). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol105/iss1/4 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTE
THERE'S No "I" IN "LEAGUE": PROFESSIONAL




IN TRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 184
I. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES ARE SINGLE ENTITIES IN
MATTERS INVOLVING LEAGUE-WIDE, NONLABOR POLICIES ... 188
A. Current Judicial Framework for Single Entity Analysis .... 189
B. Professional Sports Leagues Are Single Entities
in Nonlabor D isputes ........................................................ 191
1. A Unity of Interest Exists among All Franchises
in a Professional Sports League ................................. 191
2. The Economic Realities of Professional
Sports Leagues Dictate That Leagues Should
Be Considered Single Entities ..................................... 194
C. The Sullivan Court Misapplied Copperweld ..................... 196
1. Sullivan Incorrectly Focused on Organizational
Form, Rather Than Economic Reality ......................... 197
2. Sullivan Mistakenly Relied on Pre-Copperweld
P recedent .................................................................... 199
II. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES ARE NOT SINGLE
ENTITIES FOR PURPOSES OF LABOR DISPUTES .......................... 201
A. The Current Judicial Framework for Balancing
Antitrust and Labor Law ................................................... 202
B. Sports Leagues Are Not Single Entities in
Labor D isputes .................................................................. 205
1. A Unity of Interest Does Not Exist in the
Labor M arket .............................................................. 206
2. The Economic Realities of Professional
Sports Leagues Make Single Entity Status
for Labor Disputes Improper ...................................... 207
C O N CLU SIO N ......................................................................................... 208
* J.D. 2005. I would like to thank Jenelle Beavers, Yaman Shukairy, Timothy Wyse, and
Jeremy Suhr for their contributions and criticism. Additionally, I would like to thank my parents,
Michael and Catherine Grow, for their unwavering love and support.
Michigan Law Review
INTRODUCTION
In 1925, baseball great Ty Cobb said, "The great trouble with baseball
today is that most of its players are in the game for the money that's in it-
not for the love of it, the excitement of it, [or] the thrill of it."'
Eighty-one years later, many fans would label Cobb a visionary for hav-
ing foreseen the major role that money would play not only in Major League
Baseball, but in all of professional sports. With high salaries, ticket prices,
and profits, professional sports are no longer just a game, but a big business
worth billions of dollars . Accordingly, as the financial interests of profes-
sional sports have become primary, leagues have been forced to deal with
many of our nation's business regulations.
Like many other sectors of the national economy, professional sports
have faced antitrust scrutiny-but arguably no other sector has faced a more
haphazard application. While every professional league has received someS 4
degree of antitrust inquiry, courts have treated antitrust challenges to the
five major professional sports differently.5 The Supreme Court gave Major
League Baseball, the first professional sport to face an antitrust inquiry, an
6antitrust exemption in 1922. The Court's treatment of baseball has proven
to be an anomaly, however, as the Court has subsequently been unwilling to
extend similar protection to other sports.
Lacking an exemption, the other major professional sports leagues have
faced repeated antitrust challenges. For instance, in recent years leagues
1. Eric D. Scheible, Note, No Runs. No Hits. One Error: Eliminating Major League Base-
ball's Antitrust Exemption Will Not Save the Game, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 73, 73 (1995).
2. See JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, PAY DIRT: THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL
TEAM SPORTS 3 (1992).
3. See Jonathan C. Tyras, Players Versus Owners: Collective Bargaining and Antitrust After
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 297, 310 (1998) ("Although baseball has
enjoyed some degree of exemption from Sherman Act liability, courts have not provided a similar
luxury to other forms of entertainment or even to other sports.").
4. See Edward Mathias, Comment, Big League Perestroika? The Implications of Fraser v.
Major League Soccer, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 203, 203 n.3 (1999) (discussing several major cases).
5. For the purposes of this Note, the five major professional sports are Major League Base-
ball ("MLB"), the National Basketball Association ("NBA"), the National Football League
("NFL"), the National Hockey League ("NHL"), and Major League Soccer ("MLS").
6. See Fed. Baseball Club of Bait. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed baseball's antitrust exemption twice. Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); see also Nathaniel Grow, "A Dere-
lict in the Stream of Law": Baseball's Antitrust Exemption 39 (June 2002) (unpublished B.S. thesis,
Ohio University) (on file with the Ohio University Honors Tutorial College) (concluding that the
Court exempted baseball from antitrust law based on a finding that it was a sport, rather than a busi-
ness).
7. See Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Radovich v. Nat'l Foot-
ball League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236 (1954).
The First Circuit has also denied the MLS single entity status. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284
F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 885 (2002).
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have faced challenges to restrictions on television broadcasts8 and the uni-
lateral implementation of league-wide labor polices.9
Perhaps the most popular defense strategy employed by professional
sports leagues has been the "single entity defense."'0 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits "[elvery contract, combination ... or conspiracy[] in
restraint of trade."" Because a "combination ... or conspiracy" requires
multiple parties, courts have held that a single entity cannot be held liable
under section 1.12 Thus, single entities can only be liable under section 2 of
the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization of an industry by a single
legal entity.'3 This distinction between section 1 and section 2 is significant;
leagues benefit from avoiding section 1 liability because section 2 claims
are relatively rare14 and comparatively easy to defend."
Initially, sports leagues were successful in their use of the single entity
defense. In San Francisco Seals v. National Hockey League,16 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California held that the NHL was a
single entity." The court held that league franchises were not economic
competitors and therefore were "all members of a single unit."'8 Subsequent
courts quickly rejected the San Francisco Seals court's logic, however, and
ruled that leagues were not single entities. '9 In these decisions, courts either
8. Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
9. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); McNeil v. Nat'l Football
League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
10. See Clifford Mendelsohn, Fraser v. Major League Soccer: A New Window of Opportunity
for the Single-Entity Defense in Professional Sports, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 69, 73-74 (2003) (reporting
that sports leagues have used the single entity defense for decades).
11. Section 1 states in full:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A, § 1 (West 1997 & Supp. 2006).
12. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); City
of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767.
14. See Karen Jordan, Note, Forming a Single Entity: A Recipe for Success for New Profes-
sional Sports Leagues, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 235, 237 (2001) ("[R]are are claims under § 2 of
the Sherman Act. The few existing § 2 claims have involved upstart leagues suing established
leagues for monopolizing a professional sport." (citation omitted)).
15. See Mathias, supra note 4, at 219-20 (arguing that section 2 claims are harder to prove).
16. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
17. Id. at 968.
18. Id. at 969-70.
19. See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984) (finding that NFL teams were sufficiently independent and competitive to preclude the single
entity defense in a challenge to an NFL rule preventing teams from moving into another franchise's
home territory); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982)
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quickly dismissed the single entity defense 2° or implicitly rejected it by ap-
plying section 1 of the Sherman Act.
2'
Just when the issue seemed settled, however, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.22 gave new life to the
single entity defense. The Court held that collusion was impossible between• • 23
a company and its wholly owned subsidiary, reasoning that while collusion
is generally bad, concerted activity between a parent company and its sub-
sidiary does not deprive the market of independent sources of decision-.24
making.24 Copperweld advanced a "unity of interest" test, holding that par-
ties are a single entity when their objectives are common and their "actions
are guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but
one."21 While on its face the decision would only appear to apply to compa-
nies and their wholly owned subsidiaries, lower courts have interpreted
Copperweld broadly. For instance, the Eighth Circuit has applied Copper-
weld to an electric cooperative, holding that the cooperative was a single
entity despite the fact that it consisted of three separately owned corpora-
tions 6 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has remained silent as to how far the
logic of Copperweld should extend."
Copperweld bolsters the leagues' single entity argument. Professional
sports leagues are unique in that combination is essential to creating the ul-
timate product, even though each franchise in a league is independently
28owned. One, two, or even a handful of teams cannot produce the ultimate
(refusing to allow the single entity defense in a suit objecting to the NFL's rule preventing league
owners from owning franchises in other sports leagues); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming lower court's finding that the NFL draft was a group boycott under the
rule of reason and rejecting the league's single entity defense); Mackey v. Nat'l Football League,
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the single entity defense was unavailable to the NFL in a
challenge by players to a rule requiring any franchise signing a free agent to compensate the
player's former team).
20. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1389; N. Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at
1252.
21. Smith, 593 E2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
22. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
23. Id. at 771. Copperweld rejected the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, which histori-
cally held that "a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary were capable of conspiring in violation of
section 1" of the Sherman Act. Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 78 (citation omitted).
24. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
25. Id.
26. City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988); see
also Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (extending
the single entity defense to the NBA).
27. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 E2d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that the Su-
preme Court has not subsequently explained Copperweld).
28. Franklin M. Fisher, Christopher Maxwell, & Evan Sue Schouten, The Economics of
Sports Leagues-The Chicago Bulls Case, 10 MARQ. SPORTs L.J. 1, 5 (1999) (finding that the prod-
uct a sports league produces cannot be produced by a single team); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The MLS represents an exception to this general
rule, with owners initially having an interest in multiple franchises. However, the MLS is quickly
moving to a one-team-per-owner organization. Grahame L. Jones, MLS Looks Way Down the Field,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at D8.
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league product: championship athletic competition. 9 Leagues argue that
while teams may compete on the field, they have a unity of economic inter-
est off the field with all teams depending on the financial success of the
entire league.30 Thus, the question is whether to view a professional sports
league as a collection of McDonald's franchises (a number of independently
owned, interconnected entities with a common interest) or as collusion
among McDonald's, Wendy's, and Burger King.3
In the twenty-two years since Copperweld, attempts by sports leagues to
advance the single entity defense have received a mixed response from the
circuit courts. The Seventh Circuit, in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n,32 ruled that, at least in certain cir-
cumstances, the NBA should be considered a single entity.33 The court held
that in order to determine whether a unity of interest exists, courts should
analyze a sports league on a case-by-case basis, one facet at a time.34 The
Seventh Circuit rule is the minority, however; despite Copperweld, the other
circuits examining the question have continued to rule that sports leagues
are not single entities. 3 The First36 and Eighth37 Circuits have both ruled
against sports leagues on the single entity question. Additionally, because
the Second,18 Ninth,' 9 and D.C. Circuits have not re-examined the issue
since Copperweld, their early, nonsingle entity precedent has never been
reversed. This single entity question remains a live concern, as professional
sports leagues continue to face antitrust challenges.4'
29. Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 5.
30. See Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship, 95 F.3d at 597 (finding that the NBA produces a sin-
gle product, "NBA Basketball," that competes with other forms of entertainment).
31. Id. at 598.
32. Id. at 593.
33. Id. at 598.
34. Id. at 600.
35. But see Seabury Mgmt., Inc. v. Prof'l Golfers' Ass'n of Am., Nos. 94-1814, 94-1688,
1995 WL 241379 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995) (holding that the Professional Golfers' Association of
America ("PGA") is a single entity). However, the PGA structure is substantially different than that
of the NBA, NFL, MLB, NHL, or MLS, in that the PGA is a federation of individual golfers that
sanctions competitive tournaments across the country, while the sports leagues possess much more
control over their member teams.
36. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002); Sullivan v. Nat'l Football
League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
37. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 154 F.3d 851 (8th
Cir. 1998). A district court within the Eighth Circuit has also ruled against the NFL on the single
entity question. McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
38. N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
39. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
40. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
41. See Warnock v. Nat'l Football League, No. 05-1530, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 24167 (3d
Cir. Nov. 9, 2005) (rejecting a Pittsburgh man's antitrust suit against the NFL for allegedly forcing
cities to build new stadiums with leases favorable to league franchises); Clarett v. Nat'l Football




In applying Copperweld to professional sports leagues, the circuit courts
have failed to distinguish between suits involving nonlabor disputes and
those involving suits by players against team owners. This distinction is
critical and renders the Seventh Circuit's case-by-case approach unneces-
sary. Most nonlabor disputes, such as ownership restrictions, involve matters
in which a unity of interest is present among the teams in the league. These
teams share a common interest in the management and economic growth of
the league.42 The same unity of interest does not exist among all teams in
labor disputes. Further, the history of abusive labor practices by professional
sports leagues underscores the players' need for antitrust remedies.43 There-
fore, efforts by Congress and the courts to balance antitrust and labor law
should govern disputes between players and owners. Such a classification
scheme will provide professional sports leagues the protection of the single
entity defense, while remaining flexible enough to disallow the defense in
the future should defendants fail to show that a unity of interest exists.
This Note argues that outside of labor disputes, sports leagues should be
presumed to be single entities. Part I argues that professional sports leagues
are single entities in disputes regarding league-wide, nonlabor policy. In
particular, the focus of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on economic real-
ity rather than organizational form necessitates a finding that professional
sports leagues are single entities in nonlabor disputes. Part II argues that
professional sports leagues are not single entities for purposes of labor dis-
putes; sports leagues, on the whole, do not involve a unity of interest for
labor matters. More importantly, existing precedent outside of the profes-
sional sports context that balances labor and antitrust law should apply to
professional sports. The Note concludes that the Seventh Circuit's case-by-
case approach is unnecessary and should be rejected in favor of a more gen-
eral classification scheme in which professional sports leagues are presumed
to be single entities, with an exception for labor disputes.
I. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES ARE SINGLE ENTITIES IN MATTERS
INVOLVING LEAGUE-WIDE, NONLABOR POLICIES
Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether its Copperweld
decision implicates professional sports, sports leagues should be presump-
tively classified as single entities in nonlabor matters. Section L.A reviews
the current framework for single entity analysis. Section I.B contends that
under this framework, a unity of interest exists between teams in profes-
sional sports leagues. Section I.C argues that the court in Sullivan v.
National Football League" misapplied the single entity framework.
42. See infra Section I.B.1.
43. See infra Section II.B.
44. 34 F.3d 1091 (lst Cir. 1994).
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A. Current Judicial Framework for Single Entity Analysis
While the Supreme Court has never explicitly decided the issue, the
Court has hinted that professional sports leagues are properly classified as
single entities.45 In response to a player challenge to NFL bargaining poli-
cies, the Court noted that the teams in a sports league "are not completely
independent economic competitors" and, in fact, "depend upon a degree of
cooperation for economic survival. 4 6 Additionally, in 1982, then-Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in National Football
47League v. North American Soccer League, indicated that sports leagues are
single entities. Justice Rehnquist stated that "'individual [sports] [teams] are
[the league's] raw material,' ' 8 necessary, interdependent elements that
could not survive on their own. Rehnquist contended that NFL teams "rarely
compete in the marketplace ' 49 and acknowledged that the league structure is
"a matter of necessity."50
Two years after North American Soccer League, the Court pronounced a
single entity standard whose logic extends beyond simply a company and its
wholly owned subsidiary and instead properly encompasses any organiza-
tion with a complete "unity of interest." In Copperweld, the Court ruled that
a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary have a "unity of interest" and
are effectively a single entity.5 The Court stressed that economic reality,52
rather than organizational form, should be the primary consideration in sin-
gle entity analysis.53
With the Supreme Court failing to address the broader implications of
Copperweld,4 circuit courts have been forced to apply Copperweld without
further guidance. The current framework for single entity analysis increas-
ingly considers multiple entities with separate ownership to be single
entities when the following factors, on the whole, are present: (1) the enti-
ties share a unity of interest, (2) the entities have a common decision-
making structure, and (3) the entities serve to increase consumer welfare.
In City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. , the
Eighth Circuit considered whether an electric cooperative consisting of three
corporations was a single entity. Even though each corporation was
45. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248 (1996).
46. Id.
47. Nat'l Football League v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
48. Id. at 1077 (citation omitted) (second alteration in original).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984); see also infra
Section I.B.2.
52. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 774.
53. Id.
54. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.2d 47, 56 (1 st Cir. 2002).
55. 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1989).
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independently owned, set its own rates, and managed its own profits and
losses,56 the court held that the organization was a single entity.57 The
existence of separate corporations had little economic significance in
determining whether the cooperative was a single entity.58 The goals and
interests of a single entity, not ownership, were the dispositive factors. 59 The
court held that the logic of Copperweld extends "beyond its bare result," and
that courts should apply the reasoning of the Supreme Court, rather than
stick to just the particular facts of the decision. 60 As a result, individually
owned but ultimately interdependent economic actors should be considered
61a single entity as long as their interests do not diverge too greatly.
Following this decision, some courts have granted judicial accommoda-
62tion toward independent enterprises. Such accommodation derives from
the original intent of the Sherman Act. As "Senator Sherman stated: 'It is the
unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law and human ex-
perience, that is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful
combination.' ,6' As a result, some commentators believe that the policy goal
of enhancing consumer welfare is the sole basis for the Supreme Court's
antitrust jurisprudence. 64 This aim means that courts should be increasingly
likely to rule that multiple entities have a unity of interest, as long as effi-
65ciency and consumer welfare are increased.
56. Id. at 271.
57. Id. at 276.
58. Id. at 275.
59. See Heike K. Sullivan, Comment, Fraser v. Major League Soccer: The MLS's Single-
Entity Structure Is a "Sham", 73 TEMP. L. REV. 865, 886 (2000) (arguing that a single entity inquiry
is fact intensive and that the court must consider the entities' common goals and interests).
60. City of Mt. Pleasant, 838 F.2d at 274.
61. Id. at 277; see also Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593,
598 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that complete unity of interest is not necessary to qualify as a single
entity, but rather that some conflict is acceptable).
62. Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Some
decisions have found a single entity even in the absence of economic unity."); Bell v. Fur Breeders
Agric. Corp., 348 F.3d 1224, 1237 (10th Cir. 2003) (following the logic of City of Mt. Pleasant);
Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 794 E Supp. 1026 (D. Nev. 1992) (holding that a food franchisor and
franchisee were a single entity); see also Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir.
2002) ("Certainly the trend of section 1 law has been to soften per se rules and to recognize the need
for accommodation among interdependent enterprises.").
63. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774 n.23 (1984) (quoting
21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890)).
64. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 14, at 238 (citing 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR
SPORTS § 19.02, at 19-4 (Gary A. Uberstine & Clark Boardman Callaghan eds., 1988)).
65. See, e.g., Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single
Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 23 (1983) ("If an aspect under scrutiny could be intended to aid the entity in achieving its
goals more efficiently, the court should discount the fact that the particular aspect, if examined in the
abstract, might imply the existence of multiple economic entities.").
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B. Professional Sports Leagues Are Single
Entities in Nonlabor Disputes
Courts should find that professional sports leagues are single entities for
two reasons. First, a unity of interest exists among all franchises in a league
because teams depend on each other for competition and revenue. Second,
per Copperweld, the economic realities of the professional sports industry
dictate a general classification scheme in which sports leagues are consid-
ered single entities.
1. A Unity of Interest Exists among All Franchises
in a Professional Sports League
In the nonlabor context, the professional sports league structure satisfies
the Copperweld "unity of interest" standard. Although most courts ruling on
the issue have found that professional sports leagues are not single entities,
66
most of these cases were decided in the labor context.67 As both courts and
commentators have noted, the goals and interests of a single entity are the
primary consideration in analyzing its legal standing.68 The unity of interest
among professional sports teams is apparent when this standard is applied.
Professional sports teams produce a single product: the league sport.69 In
other words, a combination of NBA teams produces "NBA Basketball," a
combination of NFL teams produces "NFL Football," a combination of
MLB teams produces "Major League Baseball," and a combination of NHL
teams produces "NHL Hockey."7 ° These respective products consist of offi-
cially sanctioned games between league teams, over the course of a preseason,
regular season,7 and playoff or postseason. The league product ultimately
culminates in the crowning of an overall league champion. One, two, or even
66. Fraser, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (alleging that that the MLS monopolized the market
by preventing any other entity from running a competing professional league); Sullivan v. Nat'l
Football League, 34 E3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994) (involving a suit by the owner of the New England
Patriots challenging the NFL's ownership policies); McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp.
871 (D. Minn. 1992) (contesting the NFL's elimination of severance benefits and the player retire-
ment system).
67. See Fraser, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002); McNeil, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992);
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (challenging the NFL's football draft on
antitrust grounds); Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (opposing an NFL
policy requiring franchises signing a free agent to compensate the player's former team); see also
infra Part II.
68. See Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 702, 707 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) ("[S]ister subsidiaries of Hitachi, cannot conspire to restrain trade. They all act pursuant
to the same interests and goals...."); Sullivan, supra note 59, at 885.
69. Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996).
70. See id.
71. The MLB regular season consists of 162 games per team. NBA and NHL teams both
play eighty-two regular season games, while the NFL regular season lasts sixteen games.
72. See Grow, supra note 6, at 33 (discussing the benefits of the league structure in MLB).
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a handful of teams could not produce this product.73 Professional sports are
unique in that their product can only be created when a sizeable number of
teams work closely together.74
The predominant competition that occurs between teams in a profes-
sional sports league is for the league championship. Judge Williams,
dissenting in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National
Football League,7 noted that "[v]irtually every court to consider this ques-
tion has concluded that N.F.L. member clubs do not compete with each
other in the economic sense. 76 The same is true of the other sports leagues.
League teams generate most of their revenue from ticket sales and the li-
censing of local and national television broadcasts.7' The overwhelming
majority of sports teams operate in different media markets, 79 and fans in
these media markets largely root for the hometown franchise.'s Even in the
73. Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 1.
74. Id.; see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
75. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
76. Id. at 1405 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Shawn
Treadwell, Note, An Examination of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption From the Antitrust Laws, in
the Context of Professional Sports, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 962 (1996) ("[T]eams in a [profes-
sional sports] league are not economic competitors.").
77. See, e.g., S.F. Seals v. Nat'l Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969-70 (C.D. Cal. 1974)
(finding that there is no economic competition between NHL teams).
78. For instance, the NFL recently sold television broadcasting rights for the 2006 through
2011 seasons to CBS and Fox for $8 billion. Additionally, satellite television provider DirecTV will
pay the NFL $3.5 billion over five years for the exclusive rights to the "Sunday Ticket" subscription
service. Larry Stewart, New TV Deal Gives NFL the Night Shift, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at Dl.
Previously, in 1998, NFL teams earned an average of over $73 million each, per season, from the
league's national television contract. Soonhwan Lee & Hyosung Chun, Economic Values of
Professional Sport Franchises in the United States, 5 SPORT J. 3, 5 (2002), http://
www.thesportjoumal.org/2002JoumalVol5-No3/econimic-values.asp; see also Stephen F. Ross, The
Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
519, 578 (observing that NBA franchises receive significant revenue from luxury boxes, game tick-
ets, and local broadcasting rights). Merchandising revenue is relatively insignificant. See infra note
117 and accompanying text.
79. Only a few teams share a media market with another franchise in the same league. The
New York City media market hosts two MLB teams (the Yankees and Mets), two NFL teams (the
Jets and Giants), two NBA teams (the Knicks and New Jersey Nets), and three NHL teams (the
Rangers, Islanders, and New Jersey Devils). Chicago is home to two MLB teams (the Cubs and
White Sox). The Los Angeles media market has two MLB teams (the Dodgers and Los Angeles
Angels of Anaheim), two NBA teams (the Lakers and Clippers), and two NHL teams (the Kings and
Anaheim Mighty Ducks). Finally, the San Francisco Bay Area hosts two MLB teams (the Giants
and Oakland Athletics) and two NFL teams (the 49ers and Oakland Raiders). These twenty-one
teams account for only seventeen percent of the 122 total franchises in professional baseball, bas-
ketball, hockey, and football.
80. In conjunction with its fiftieth anniversary in 2004, Sports Illustrated conducted surveys
of sports fans in each of the fifty states. These surveys show that, of states hosting professional
franchises, fans largely support the home-state teams. SI.com, Sports Illustrated 50th Anniversary,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.conmagazine/features/si50/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2006). The numbers
would likely be even greater if captured on a city-by-city level. See also David Morris & Daniel
Kraker, Rooting the Home Team: Why the Packers Won't Leave--and Why the Browns Did, AMERI-
CAN PROSPECT, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 38 (noting that cities support their local professional teams with
"frenzied enthusiasm"). Further, merchandise sales are largely regional, with hometown fans buying
hometown team merchandise. See Steve Luhm, Jerseys Wearing Well; 'Tis the Season: Pro Gear a
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few instances in which teams share a media market, each franchise has its
own fan base, so the teams generally do not compete for fan loyalty.8 As a
result, the only economic competition engaged in by professional sports
leagues is with other, competing forms of entertainment. 82 For example,
sports teams compete against teams in other leagues in the same city.
MLB's Detroit Tigers compete for Detroiters' entertainment dollars with the
NBA's Detroit Pistons, the NFL's Detroit Lions, and the NHL's Detroit Red
Wings, in addition to other forms of entertainment, such as movies, theater,
and concerts. Competition between teams in the same league, however, is
extremely limited. Even if some competition exists between two franchises
in a shared media market, that competition is not enough to require a finding
that the league as a whole lacks a unity of interest when formulating league-
wide policy. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, "Copperweld does not
hold that only conflict-free enterprises may be treated as single entities."83
Moreover, not only is there minimal or nonexistent competition between
franchises in a professional sports league, but an individual team's economic
success depends on cooperation with its league partners. 84 A team cannot
make money unless it has another team to play: "in effect, all team revenue
is jointly produced. 8 5 Further, most sports leagues have revenue-sharing
agreements, in which individual teams pool their revenue and split it among
86their fellow league members. The NFL has the most extensive revenue-sharing system, with over ninety percent of all revenue shared among the
Popular Gift Item; Kirilenko a Popular Choice Among Jazz Fans; Jerseys Fluctuate with Wins, Inju-
ries, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 25, 2005, at C7 (noting that NBA and NFL merchandise sales are
regionally driven).
81. See Mike Berardino, If 2 is Company, 3 may be a Crowd, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 29,
2000, at D4 (noting that the New York Yankees and New York Mets have separate fan bases); David
Lennon & Oli Schepers, Two-Minute Drill, NEWSDAY, Sept. 17, 2003, at A71 (remarking that the
Chicago "Cubs and White Sox [have] very distinct fan bases").
82. See Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 13 ("[Slports leagues compete with other entertain-
ment products.").
83. See Chi. Prof'I Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir.
1996); City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. 838 F.2d 268, 277 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Even
though the cooperatives may quarrel among themselves on how to divide the spoils of their eco-
nomic power, it cannot reasonably be said that they are independent sources of that power .... They
are interdependent, not independent.").
84. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (MacKinnon, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
85. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1402 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1984) (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. The NFL and MLB have both implemented revenue-sharing agreements, while the NBA
has enacted indirect revenue sharing in the form of luxury-tax systems. Derrick Goold, On Thin Ice:
The NHL's Defining Moment, ST. Louis POST-DiSPATCH, Sept. 14, 2003, at DI. The luxury tax
requires an owner to pay a fine to the other teams if his team's payroll is higher than a predeter-
mined ceiling. Id. In its new Collective Bargaining Agreement, the NHL agreed to a system in which
the league's "top 10 revenue teams pay into the revenue-sharing fund and the bottom 15 clubs share




87franchises. Because of such revenue sharing, the economic success of an
individual team is directly dependent upon the economic success of the88
other teams in the league. As Judge Williams recognized in dissent in Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission, no distinction exists between the
league structure and its member teams. 9 The two are intertwined. Therefore,
the relevant entity for antitrust analysis in professional sports is not the indi-
vidual team, but the league structure.
2. The Economic Realities of Professional Sports Leagues Dictate
That Leagues Should Be Considered Single Entities
Copperweld provides further justification for professional sports
leagues' classification as single entities, since economic reality, rather than
organizational form, is the primary consideration in single entity analysis. 9°
While single entities will normally have a single owner, single ownership is
not required under the defense.9' The economic realities of the business of
professional sports make professional sports leagues single entities for pur-
poses of league-wide policy.
92
Although single entities typically share common ownership, such a
structure is not feasible for professional sports leagues. Independent owner-
ship of sports teams is necessary for the public to have confidence that
games are not fixed.93 The biggest threat to a sports league's credibility is
the possibility that games have predetermined outcomes. Fans have little
reason to follow, let alone pay to attend, an athletic competition in which the
outcome has been fixed. For instance, the 1919 "Black Sox" scandal sub-
stantially damaged professional baseball's reputation, damage that took
years to heal.94 "League sports demand a form of organization in which local
87. See Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 92. The MLB revenue-sharing agreement was ex-
pected to reallocate approximately $250 million from high-revenue to low-revenue clubs during the
2005 season. Ken Rosenthal, In Free Agency, Money Will Flow; Players, Rejoice: Market Appears
Ready to Move Up, CHI. IRIB., Oct. 10, 2004, at C5.
88. See LA. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1405 (Williams, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that the value of a sports franchise is directly connected to the suc-
cess of the larger league).
89. Id. at 1406.
90. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774 (1984).
91. City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that a cooperative consisting of three separate corporations qualified as a single entity); see also
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29 (1962) (holding,
before Copperweld, that separately owned companies were a single enterprise on the grounds that
"[t]here is no indication that the use of separate corporations had economic significance in itself").
92. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771 (discussing a parent company and its wholly owned
subsidiary).
93. See Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir.
1996) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (contending that sports leagues insist independent ownership is nec-
essary to enhance "the appearance of competitiveness demanded by fans").
94. See CHARLES C. ALEXANDER, OUR GAME: AN AMERICAN BASEBALL HISTORY 129
(1991) (finding that regaining the public's confidence "in the competitive integrity" of the sport was
"a lot tougher" than many had supposed). The "Black Sox" scandal involved the Chicago White
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autonomy is both present and [evident]." ' Independent ownership prevents
the threat of centralized management dictating the results of any given con-
test. With independent ownership, one owner's defection can destroy a
manipulated outcome. Many owners in professional sports take great pride
in fielding the most competitive team possible, simply because they want to
win championships. George Steinbrenner of the New York Yankees and
Jerry Jones of the Dallas Cowboys are two such examples. 96 The existence
of such independently minded owners diminishes the possibility that the
league as a whole could successfully execute planned outcomes to sporting
events. The league simply lacks the authority or ability to force independent
league owners to acquiesce to predetermined outcomes.
One of the biggest problems that faced the World Wrestling Federation's
failed XFL football league was the fact that all teams were run by a central
authority.97 With one party in charge of all teams, there was no way to assure
the public that competitions were not fixed. Even the recently formed MLS
recognized the importance of having each franchise operated by an inde-
pendent management team.9s The economic realities of professional sports
dictate that leagues must have independently owned teams.
The fact that owners are motivated to win on the field does not diminish
the unity of interest shared by franchises in a particular league. While win-
ning generally increases ticket sales, most teams in a league do not compete
with each other for ticket sales because they are not within close geographic
proximity to other teams in their league. 99 Rather, a winning team helps its
owner compete for ticket sales with other forms of entertainment.'00
A second economic reality of professional sports is that competitive
balance between teams must be maintained. In order to hold the public's
attention, professional sports leagues must have exciting on-field
competition.'0 ' Such competition requires a balanced distribution of players
across all the teams in the league. Yet, a finite number of highly skilled
players exist in each sport.'0 2 League-wide policies, such as new player
Sox, prohibitive favorites who intentionally lost the 1919 World Series. Eight White Sox players
("Shoeless" Joe Jackson, Eddie Cicotte, Chick Gandil, Hap Felsch, Lefty Williams, Buck Weaver,
Charles "Swede" Risberg, and Fred McMullin) intentionally lost the Series after being bribed by
gamblers. Id. at 123-24.
95. Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 6.
96. See Mike Lupica, Time for the Big Spenders to Settle Up, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 4,
2005, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/front/story/371548p-316099c.html.
97. See Dan Ackman, XFL Exterminated, FORBES, May I1, 2001, available at http://
www.forbes.com/2001/05/11/0511 topnews.html ("The XFL mistakenly called itself an eight-team
'league.' A league implies separate and distinct teams with different owners .. ").
98. See Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 72 (reporting that although the league owns a share of
each team, each franchise has a separate "owner-operator" who runs the team).
99. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
101. Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 6.
102. See Grow, supra note 6, at 60-61 (noting that the supply of major league caliber baseball
players is much less than the demand for such players).
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drafts, are necessary in order to ensure a balanced distribution of players.
0 3
Consequently, maintaining competitive balance necessarily requires
interaction among all teams in the league. Without a league structure to
create and uphold competitive balance, competitions would just be glorified
"pick-up games."' 4
C. The Sullivan Court Misapplied Copperweld
Despite the unity of interest in professional sports leagues, courts have
nevertheless ruled that leagues are not single entities. Of the three courts to
rule on the single entity status of professional sports leagues since the Cop-
perweld decision, only one considered a nonlabor league policy: Sullivan v.
National Football League. In Sullivan, the owner of the New England Pa-
triots sought to sell shares of his franchise publicly. 'O Sullivan's plan was
disallowed for two reasons: First, Article 3.5 of the NFL constitution re-
quired three-fourths of league teams to approve the sale of a league
franchise, and second, an uncodified policy precluded the public sale of
ownership interests in an NFL club.07 Sullivan sued, alleging that the NFL's
denial of his plan constituted a violation of the Sherman Act. In deciding the
case, the Sullivan court ruled that the league was not a single entity because
teams compete with one another "for things like fan support, players,
coaches, ticket sales, local broadcast revenues, and the sale of team para-
phernalia."'0 8 The court also deferred to the district court's factual finding
"that NFL teams ... compete against each other for the sale of their owner-
ship interests.
This Section argues that Sullivan incorrectly applied Copperweld in two
ways. First, it wrongly focused on organizational form, not economic reality.
Second, the Sullivan court was mistakenly swayed by the logic of pre-
Copperweld decisions finding that sports leagues are not single entities.
103. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that player drafts are necessary for competitive
balance).
104. See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1408 (9th
Cir. 1984) (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Without the league, professional
football becomes a pursuit no more substantial than a group of finely-tuned athletes traveling hap-
hazardly about, in search of playing competition.").
105. 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994). Two other post-Copperweld cases have involved challenges
to league labor policies. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (contesting
MLS's league structure and transfer fee system, which required a franchise acquiring a player to pay
the player's former team); McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992)
(challenging an NFL plan to fix all player salaries according to a wage scale). While teams in a
professional sports league have a unity of interest in nonlabor matters, the same is not true in player
policy because teams actively compete for players. See infra Section I1.B.1.
106. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1096.
107. Id. at 1095.
108. Id. at 1098.
109. Id.
[Vol. 105:183
There's No "I" in "League"
1. Sullivan Incorrectly Focused on Organizational Form,
Rather Than Economic Reality
The Copperweld court stressed that economic reality, rather than organ-
izational form, should be the primary consideration in single entity
analysis."0 The goals and interests of a single entity, not ownership, are dis-
positive."' In Sullivan, however, the court held that a unity of interest did
not exist among NFL teams because the teams competed "for things like fan
support, players, coaches, ticket sales, local broadcast revenues, and the sale
of team paraphernalia."' 12 As the Mt. Pleasant court indicated, though, an
absolute, complete unity of interest is not necessary for a finding that a sin-
gle entity exists; some competition and conflict is permissible."
3
The Sullivan court overemphasized trivial competition between teams
and ignored the number of common interests shared in the league." 4 With
few exceptions-namely New York City and the San Francisco Bay area, the
only two-team NFL markets-NFL franchises generally do not compete
with each other economically. "' Even in those instances in which competi-
tion may exist, most NFL games sell out, so teams are not cutthroat
competitors with one another for ticket sales.' 6 Furthermore, the NFL has a
national television deal, so teams do not compete for local broadcast reve-
nue. The sale of paraphernalia is rather insignificant for most franchises, as
most team revenue is generated from ticket sales and the NFL's national
television deal.' In professional sports, paraphernalia sales are largely re-
gional, with hometown fans buying hometown team merchandise. ' In the
NBA, such merchandise revenue is split fifty-fifty between the league and
players, not teams." 9 Most sports leagues require merchandise to be licensed
110. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774 (1984).
Ill. See Sullivan, supra note 59, at 885-86.
112. Sullivan, 34 E3d at 1098.
113. The Mt. Pleasant court ruled that an electric cooperative had a unity of interest, even
though the companies were each separately owned. City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 271 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus
Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962) (holding, pre-Copperweld, that three related corporations were a
single enterprise).
114. See supra Section I.B. 1.
115. See sources cited supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
116. NFL attendance averaged ninety-seven percent of capacity in 2002. Richard Weiner,
Playoff Jumble, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 2002, at IC.
117. See Paul Doyle, Watch While You Can: Lockout May End Careers, Franchises, HART-
FORD COURANT, Oct. 8, 2003, at C8 (reporting that NFL teams each receive $77 million a year from
the NFL's national television deal); Gary Haber, Trophy Won't Alter Bucs' Value, TAMPA TRIB., Jan.
30, 2003, at Moneysense 5 ("[NFL] owners derive most of their revenue from a national television
contract... ").




through the league office, rather than by individual teams.12 Therefore, indi-
vidual teams do not rely on merchandise sales for a significant proportion of
their profits. Any competition in the merchandising realm is not enough to
alter the single entity analysis for professional sports leagues.' 2'
Moreover, the economic realities of the business of professional sports
dictate that teams must be separately operated. Without independent man-
agement, the public will reasonably wonder whether outcomes have been
fixed. 1 2 Each team in a league should not have to be league-owned and op-
erated in order for the single entity defense to apply. The Sullivan court
erred in ignoring the economic realities of the business of professional
sports and misapplied Copperweld in finding that NFL teams do not have a
unity of interest.
The Sullivan court should have ruled as a matter of law that NFL teams
do not compete against each other for the sale of their ownership interests.
Purely selfish, competitive motivations do not explain the passage of Article
3.5 of the NFL constitution, which places significant restrictions upon all
owners attempting to sell their franchises. Instead, the rule advances a le-
gitimate league interest in ensuring that only owners with the requisite
financial capital to run a franchise effectively are able to purchase a team.
In most sectors of the economy, if someone overextends himself finan-
cially when purchasing a business, his decision will generally have little
effect on the industry as a whole or the public at-large. In professional
sports, however, franchises with undercapitalized owners can harm not only
their entire league but also their home city. Having even a single team go out
of business would have a destructive effect on both the city and league in
which it is located. Many cities have invested hundreds of millions of dol-
lars in stadiums for professional sports, investments that would largely be- 123
lost should franchises cease operations. Further, the effect of a team going
out of business would take a huge toll on its league, requiring rescheduling,
realignment, and reallocation of players.
Even aside from a franchise going "out of business," under-
capitalized owners are detrimental to league-wide competitiveness. Many
120. See Stephen C. Fehr, Pricey New Sports Venues Help Make Washington No. I for High-
Cost Tickets, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1997, at Col.
121. See text accompanying supra note 83.
122. See discussion supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
123. Matt Welch, If You Build It, They Will Leave, REASON, Jan. 2004, http://
www.reason.com/0401/co.mw.if.shtml (noting that municipalities spent over $14.7 billion on stadi-
ums for professional sports leagues in the twentieth century). This trend shows no signs of stopping
anytime soon. See David Nakamura & Thomas Heath, For Some Fans, Stadium Designers Whiffed
Big-Time, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2006, at B01 (reporting that the city of Washington D.C. commit-
ted $611 million to build MLB's Washington Nationals a new stadium); Jeffrey Spivak & Deann
Smith, Is Deal Good For Teams? Taxpayers? Fans?, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 5, 2006 (noting that
both the NFL's Kansas City Chiefs and MLB's Kansas City Royals are seeking public financing for
renovations to their current home stadiums).
124. Marc Topkin, Contraction Could Help Tampa Bay, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 13,
2002, at 9C (reporting that elimination of some MLB franchises would result in reallocation of
players and realignment of teams among the divisions and leagues).
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underperforming teams are owned by penny-pinching owners and harm the
overall strength of the league.'25 Thus, leagues have good reason to institute
rules ensuring that new owners have the requisite financial backing to run a
professional sports franchise effectively.16 Also, because professional sports
ownership is "'the ultimate millionaire's dream ... an ego trip and a
half,' ,,27 a large pool of potential, well-financed buyers is always available
to purchase a sports franchise.12 Accordingly, competition between current
owners for potential purchasers is not a significant enough concern to
prevent a finding that sports leagues are single entities.
Moreover, as noted above, public confidence in the legitimacy of the
outcomes of professional sporting events depends largely on independent
franchise ownership." 9 Without regulations requiring league approval of
franchise sales, one owner could purchase several competing franchises in
the same league. Under such a scenario, games or trades between two teams
with a shared owner would be ripe for public skepticism.
2. Sullivan Mistakenly Relied on Pre-Copperweld Precedent
In addition to its misapplication of Copperweld, the Sullivan court also
erred by mistakenly following the logic of precedent determined before
Copperweld. As primary support for its decision, the Sullivan court relied on
the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission
v. National Football League.'3" This reliance was misguided, as that court
made several incorrect assertions in finding that the NFL was not a single
entity.
First, the Los Angeles Memorial court improperly focused on the fact
that league policies are not determined by "one individual or parent corpora-
tion, but by the separate teams acting jointly."' 31 While this is true in one
sense, it is not entirely accurate. The Los Angeles Memorial court itself
125. See, e.g., Bob Cook, Competence in Clippers-land? It's True!, MSNBC.coM, Dec. 1, 2005,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/10188125/ (detailing the correlation between the NBA's Los Angeles Clip-
pers' notoriously frugal owner Donald Sterling's spending habits and the franchise's losing history);
Drew Sharp, Revolt Needs Dose of Apathy, DETROIT FREE PREss, Dec. 17, 2005, available at http://
www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AD=/20051217/SPORTSOI/512170308/1089/COLO8 (arguing
that the infamously cheap spending habits of Mike Brown, owner of the NFL's Cincinnati Bengals,
relegated his team to years of misfortune).
126. While league approval could potentially have the paradoxical effect of preventing under-
financed owners from selling their team to a richer purchaser, there is no reason to believe that
league owners would use these rules in such a perverse way.
127. Alan Snel, Owning Sports Team "All About Ego", TAMPA TRiB., Jan. 23, 2004, at Mon-
eysense 1.
128. Richard Sandomir, Newest Game Is Buying and Selling Teams, N.Y. IMES, Apr. 30,
2000, § 8, at 11 (reporting that twenty-six professional sports teams were bought and sold during the
prior twenty-eight months).
129. See sources cited supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
130. See Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1097-1100 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing
L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984)).
131. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n. 726 F.2d at 1388-89.
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noted a few paragraphs later that then-NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle
made many of the "day-to-day decisions regarding League operations.' 32
Admittedly, limited joint decision-making alone cannot lead to a finding that
an organization is a single entity; otherwise any price-fixing behavior would
be protected from antitrust law. Professional sports leagues' joint decision-
making is much more comprehensive, however, involving league rules,
standards, dates, locations, and so forth. 33 The NFL's unified decision-
making process illustrates the NFL franchises' unity of interest. NFL teams
cannot be divergent, cutthroat economic competitors when they must work
so closely together to set league-wide policies.
Second, the Los Angeles Memorial court's analysis incorrectly empha-
sized the fact that NFL teams do not share profits and losses. 34 In doing so,
the court discounted the fact that NFL teams share up to ninety-five percent
of their revenue, 3 arguing that even with revenue sharing, profits vary
among teams in the league. 36 The Copperweld Court was concerned with
the alignment of economic interests and never required a complete sharing
of profits and losses in order for an organization to qualify as a single en-
tity. 137 By discounting the NFL's significant revenue sharing, the Los Angeles
Memorial court mistakenly focused on the organizational form rather than
the economic realities of the NFL.
Finally, the Los Angeles Memorial court erred in analogizing the NFL to
the organization considered in United States v. Sealy, Inc. 13 In Sealy, thirty
bedding manufacturers were licensed to use the Sealy name and allocated
territories in which to use the license.
39 The thirty licensees owned Sealy.'4
The Sealy Court held that this arrangement was a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. 4' The Los Angeles Memorial court analogized the NFL struc-
ture to that disallowed in Sealy. Sealy, however, is easily distinguishable
from the situation of the NFL and other professional sports leagues because
in Sealy each licensee "had a viable product that did not require cooperation
with competitors.' 42 The same is not true of professional sports, which re-
132. Id. at 1389.
133. Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace Competi-
tion in the Marketplace?, 60 TENN. L. REV. 263, 275-76 (1993) ("[T]eams must agree on the rules
of the game, uniforms and equipment, the dates and locations of each contest, and so on.").
134. LA. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1390.
135. See Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 92. The NFL has had a revenue-sharing plan in place
since 1961, allocating all television revenue evenly among franchises. Clay Moorehead, Revenue
Sharing and the Salary Cap in the NFL: Perfecting the Balance Between NFL Socialism and Unre-
strained Free-Trade, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 641,642 (2006).
136. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1390.
137. See generally Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
138. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
139. Id. at 352.
140. Id. at 352-53.
141. Id. at 357-58.
142. Mathias, supra note 4, at 213.
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quire cooperation in order to produce the final product, the league sport.' 3
Therefore, courts should generally classify professional sports leagues as
single entities for matters of league-wide, nonlabor policy.
II. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES ARE NOT SINGLE ENTITIES FOR
PURPOSES OF LABOR DISPUTES
Conceptually, one of the most difficult areas of antitrust analysis occurs
when antitrust law intersects with labor law.'44 While antitrust law estab-
lishes a mechanism by which to attack illegal collusion, labor law seeks to
protect and regulate collective action by laborers, particularly in the form of
labor unions.4 1 Since many of the antitrust challenges faced by professional
sports leagues result from disputes with labor unions, this question is par-
ticularly important in determining professional sports leagues' antitrust
status. This Part argues that professional sports leagues are not single enti-
ties for purposes of labor disputes. 46 Section II.A examines the current
judicial balance between antitrust and labor law, and contends that profes-
sional sports leagues' labor disputes are properly adjudicated under this
general framework. Section II.B argues that under Copperweld, a unity of
interest does not exist among sports teams in the labor market, and thus the
single entity defense is inapplicable to labor disputes.
143. See text accompanying supra notes 69-74; see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (finding entity's activities lawful when cooperation was neces-
sary to produce a new product).
144. Cf Brian T. Coolidge, Casenote, Form Over Function: The Goals of Labor and Antitrust
Laws Sacrificed Upon a Collective Bargaining Impasse, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116
(1996), 38 S. TIx. L. REV. 841, 844 (1997) (remarking that antitrust and labor law "are sometimes
said to have competing interests under the law").
145. Labor law's statutory exemptions seek to "insulate legitimate collective activity by em-
ployees, which is inherently anticompetitive, but is favored by federal labor policy, from the
proscriptions of the antitrust laws." Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir.
1976) (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940)).
146. While this Section of the Note only discusses disputes between players and owners,
players are not the only unionized group of employees in professional sports. Each league's umpires
or referees have unionized. For discussion of the MLB Umpires Association, see Heather R. Insley,
Comment, Major League Umpires Association: Is Collective Bargaining the Answer to or the Prob-
lem in the Contractual Relationships of Professional Sports Today?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 601 (2001).
See also Clayton: Officials not voting by e-mail, ESPN.coM, Sept. 17, 2001, http://espn.go.com/
nfl/news/2001/0917/125189 l.html (reporting on a labor dispute between the NFL Referees Associa-
tion and the league); NHL Officials Without Work During Player Lockout, HOCKEYREFS.COM, Oct.
13, 2004, http://www.hockeyrefs.com/intheheadlines/10132004.htm (discussing the 2004-05 NHL
lockout's impact on the NHL Officials Association); Stern Upset Over Protest by NBA Refs,
MSNBC.coM, Feb. 29, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/%204402659/ (noting that the National
Basketball Referees Association protested the three-game suspension of one referee).
Sports leagues' single entity status in disputes between referees and owners is not considered
in this Note, although the author observes that the analysis may very well differ, since teams would
not appear to have divergent, competitive interests in this realm. Referees and umpires serve the
entire league, rather than individual teams, so franchises do not have any individual interest in these
labor negotiations, outside of the success of the league as a whole. Therefore, it would seem there is




A. The Current Judicial Framework for Balancing
Antitrust and Labor Law
Both Congress and the courts have long struggled to create a balance be-
tween antitrust and labor law. During the initial Congressional debate over
the Sherman Act, many senators expressed concern over the bill's impact on
labor.147 In fact, Senator Sherman proposed an amendment to the act "ex-
pressly exempt[ing] labor and agricultural combinations.' ' 48 Ultimately,
Congress deemed the amendment "unnecessary" and passed the bill without
the labor exemption. 49The courts, though, saw matters differently and used
the Sherman Act against labor unions. 5° In response, Congress passed three
different pieces of legislation intended to exempt labor combinations from
antitrust scrutiny: section 6 of the Clayton Act in 1914,' the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in 1932, 1 2 and finally the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") in 1935.153 Together, these acts form a statutory exemption for
labor activity from the antitrust laws.5 4
The Supreme Court supplemented this legislative framework "[t]o fur-
ther encourage collective bargaining between unions and multi-employer
bargaining units ' by developing the so-called "nonstatutory labor excep-
tion," a principle by which cases implicating both antitrust and labor law are
adjudicated. In the seminal cases of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader'56 and Local
Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel
Tea Co.,"' the Supreme Court established the rule that "absent a motive to
impose direct restraints on commercial competition or to monopolize unlaw-
fully a relevant business market," agreements resulting from collective
bargaining are exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 15 Thus, "if a collective bar-
gaining agreement substantially affects market conditions without
promoting legitimate union concerns, courts will not grant antitrust immu-
147. Elinor R. Hoffmann, Labor and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50
BROOK. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1983).
148. Id. at 16.
149. Id. at 18-19.
150. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (finding that the Sherman Act is applicable to
labor organizations).
151. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
153. Id.; see also Coolidge, supra note 144, at 845 (reporting that the NLRA was enacted to
balance "the inequality of bargaining power that employees possessed in relation to management by
promoting collective bargaining thereby 'leveling the playing field' ").
154. See Treadwell, supra note 76, at 955.
155. Id. at 960.
156. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
157. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
158. Hoffmann, supra note 147, at 32-33 (citation omitted).
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nity."'59 Otherwise, collective bargaining agreements are generally immune
from antitrust laws. 6°
Despite this established framework balancing the concerns of antitrust
and labor law, at least one court has departed from the Apex Hosiery and
Jewel Tea rule in the sports context. Mackey v. National Football 
League 6'
involved a suit by thirty-six players challenging the NFL's so-called "Ro-
zelle Rule.' 62 The Mackey court departed from Supreme Court precedent
and instead applied a three-part test to determine whether the Rozelle Rule
should be exempted. The court, citing Jewel Tea, held that the labor policy
in question must (1) primarily affect "only the parties to the collective bar-
gaining relationship," (2) concern mandatory subjects of collectivei • • 163
bargaining, and (3) be the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.
The court held that while the Rozelle Rule satisfied the first two criteria, it
failed to meet the third, finding that the league had unilaterally imposed the
rule on players. 64
Unless labor disputes in professional sports can be differentiated from
other industries on some relevant grounds, leagues should be held to the
Apex Hosiery and Jewel Tea balancing test, rather than the three-part
Mackey test. After Congress created the nation's labor laws, commentators
argued that those laws embodied a recognition that "the rules of the com-
mercial market place are inapposite" to the labor market. Instead,
Congress sought to create a system in which parties have roughly equal bar-
gaining power, resulting in wages "fair to labor and commercially feasible
for their employers."'6 Considering the history of abusive labor practices by
159. Jonathan C. Latimer, Comment, The NBA Salary Cap: Controlling Labor Costs Through
Collective Bargaining, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 205, 215 (1994).
160. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd on
other grounds, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The nonstatutory exemption, created by the courts,
was designed to favor labor law over antitrust law by permitting collective bargaining between un-
ions and employers over wages, hours and working conditions.").
Note that the extent of protection offered by the nonstatutory labor exemption once a collective
bargaining agreement has expired-a question rather uniquely implicated by the professional sports
industry-remains unsettled. Kieran M. Corcoran, Note, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Non-
statutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1994); see also
Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 352;
Treadwell, supra note 76, at 966.
161. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
162. Id. at 609. The Rozelle Rule provided the following:
[If] a player's contractual obligation to a team expires and he signs with a different club, the
signing club must provide compensation to the player's former team. If the two clubs are un-
able to conclude mutually satisfactory arrangements, the Commissioner may award
compensation in the form of one or more players and/or draft choices as he deems fair and eq-
uitable.
Id. at 609 n. 1.
163. Id. at 614.
164. Id. at615-16.
165. Hoffmann, supra note 147, at 1.
166. Id. at 2.
October 20061
Michigan Law Review
professional sports owners,16 the same concerns targeted by Congress in
other industries are present in professional sports.' 8 Therefore, professional
sports should be bound by the same judicial test 69 as other professions.
While professional athletes certainly garner higher salaries than workers in
most other fields, 70 none of the applicable statutes or case law makes any




Furthermore, the additional factors delineated by the Mackey court ' are
unnecessary. The professional sports industry does not require a more com-
prehensive test than that imposed upon all other industries. While the Apex
Hosiery and Jewel Tea test generally extends an antitrust exemption to any
collective bargaining agreement, as long as it does not restrain or monopo-•• 173
lize competition, Mackey adds two requirements: that the agreement
(1) concerns "a mandatory subject of collective bargaining," and (2) is the
product of "arm's-length bargaining."'7 4 The Supreme Court's formulation
sufficiently protects the interests of the athletes and their unions. By permit-
ting the agreements to address matters beyond mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining, the Apex Hosiery and Jewel Tea rule gives players and
owners greater leeway in negotiations. Players and owners may well be able
to gain key concessions in return for negotiating away other, "nonmanda-
tory" issues, reaching agreements that benefit both parties.
As for the Mackey court's "arm's-length bargaining" requirement, cur-
rent doctrine already accommodates such concerns. Players have the option
of decertifying their union and challenging disputed provisions in an anti-
trust action should terms be imposed upon them in bad faith. 5 This
167. See infra notes 190-197 and accompanying text.
168. This existing legal framework adequately accounts for the unique needs of the business
of professional sports. Courts can consider the fact that leagues need to maintain competitive bal-
ance when analyzing an antitrust challenge to a labor policy. Richard E. Bartok, Note, NFL Free
Agency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack, 1991 DUKE L.J. 503, 523 ("[F]ree agency restrictions'
impact on the sports league as a product is relevant to Section 1 scrutiny.").
169. The Apex and Jewel Tea test. See sources cited supra notes 156-160 and accompanying
text.
170. The NBA's average salary is $4.5 million per season. MLB players receive an average of
$2.5 million. NHL players average $1.65 million, while NFL players average $1.25 million per
season. Mike Ulmer, The Last Word, TORONTO SUN, Nov. 4, 2003, at 87.
171. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10,
113-15 (2000).
172. See discussion supra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
173. See discussion supra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
174. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
175. Latimer, supra note 159, at 231. NFL players decertified their union in the late 1980s.
Marc J. Yoskowitz, Note, A Confluence of Labor and Antitrust Law: The Possibility of Union Decer-
tification in the National Basketball Association to Avoid the Bounds of Labor Law and Move into
the Realm of Antitrust, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 579, 580; see also Eric. R. McDonough, Com-
ment, Escaping Antitrust lmmunity---Decertification of the National Basketball Players Association,
37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 821 (1997).
Congress recently extended this privilege to MLB players by partially revoking the sport's an-
titrust exemption in the Curt Flood Act of 1998. 15 U.S.C. § 26(b) (2000 & Supp. mH 2003). The Act
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procedure has become increasingly popular across the economy in recent
years. 7 6 Owners are less likely to engage in bad faith negotiations knowing
that their actions could be subject to an antitrust challenge by the players in
court. The mechanism is far from a guaranteed success for players, however,
as they must still go through a number of legal steps after decertification in
order for a judge to declare their negotiations with the league at an im-
passe.'1 Thus, both the threat and procedural requirements of decertification
provide strong motivation for owners and players, respectively, to participate
in the negotiations in good faith. 78 Because players already have a tool with
which to attack unilaterally imposed provisions, adding an "arm's-length"
requirement to the judicial test is unnecessary.
While it may be possible that a collective bargaining agreement pro-
tected under Apex Hosiery and Jewel Tea is unsatisfactory to some players,
U.S. labor policy has been calibrated to allow the majority of employees to
act on behalf of all employees. 9 Further, the added elements of the Mackey
test do not provide any further protection for "marginalized" players. There-
fore, professional sports owners and athletes should be given the same
leeway as other management and labor in other industries. The Apex Ho-
siery and Jewel Tea test can sufficiently adjudicate labor disputes
encompassing antitrust challenges to professional sports leagues.
B. Sports Leagues Are Not Single Entities in Labor Disputes
While this Note has argued that professional sports leagues should be
classified as single entities, one exception to this general classification is for
matters involving suits by players and their unions against the sports
leagues. The various teams in a league do not share a unity of interest in
matters involving labor disputes. First, although teams share a common eco-
nomic interest in nonlabor policy to see that the league as a whole thrives,
teams have divergent interests in the labor market.8 Second, even if a unity of
interest exists within the labor market, history shows an economic reality that
leagues are prone to instituting abusive labor policies, meaning that a general,
single entity exception shielding such policies from antitrust review would be
left baseball's antitrust exemption in place for nonlabor disputes. Antitrust Exemption Lifted for
Labor Issues, BALT. SUN, Oct. 28, 1998, at 3D. While the Act was largely symbolic, it nevertheless
granted MLB players the ability to take owners to court for antitrust violations, placing players on
equal footing with their colleagues in the other professional sports. Grow, supra note 6, at 56.
176. David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law:
Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1268,
1320 (1988).
177. Yoskowitz, supra note 175, at 615-17.
178. Latimer, supra note 159, at 231.
179. See id. at 229 n.168 (arguing that section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act pre-
fers collective action to individual employee representation).
180. See Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 603 (7th Cir.




improper."' More specifically, any unity of interest among sports franchises
in the realm of labor policy is generally not the result of necessity or eco-
nomic reality, but simply driven by a desire to reduce labor costs.
Consequently, the Copperweld rule is improper for sports leagues in this
context.
1. A Unity of Interest Does Not Exist in the Labor Market
No unity of interest exists for professional sports leagues in the labor
market. At the most basic level, all teams in a professional sports league5 12
have an interest in obtaining the best players possible. While leagues gen-
erally need competitive balance to survive,' individual teams nevertheless
benefit by placing the best team possible on the field each season.'8 Win-
ning increases ticket sales, leading to greater profits overall.8 5 In this vein,
teams also compete to acquire the best coaches and management person-
nel. 86 Thus, the interests of the individual teams diverge in the labor
market.'17 Admittedly, all teams share. a common interest in the labor market,
in that all would benefit by keeping labor costs low. 8 However, this interest
is not sufficient to qualify the league as a single entity in the labor context.
All businesses in any given industry have a common interest in keeping the
181. See text accompanying infra notes 190-197.
182. Mathias, supra note 4, at 227.
183. See text accompanying supra notes 10 1-104.
184. Quirk and Fort identify a fascinating tension between the need for competitive balance
within a league to maintain fan interest throughout the league, and the yearning of owners and fans
alike for truly memorable dominant teams, like the 1927 Yankees, the 1931 Athletics, the 1962
Packers, the 1965 Celtics, the 1967 76ers, the 1972 Lakers, or the 1973 Dolphins-the teams that
fans and sportswriters talk about for years afterwards. QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 242.
185. See Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 7 (noting that richer owners "have an incentive to buy
up the best players"). This motivation for on-field success mainly implicates competition vis-a-vis
other forms of entertainment, such as local teams in other professional sports leagues, movies, con-
certs, etc. See text accompanying supra notes 76-82. Even in the few cases in which teams share a
media market with another franchise in their league, fan bases are largely separate, meaning that
relatively little competition for ticket sales exists between shared market franchises. Id. Therefore,
the motivation for on-field success does not have a significant impact on each league's overall unity
of interest.
186. See, e.g., McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F Supp. 871, 879 n.10 (D. Minn. 1992).
187. Fisher et al., supra note 28, at 7. Further, aside from each individual team's motive to
acquire the best available talent, most professional sports leagues feature a regular divide between
so-called "small market" and "large market" teams in regard to labor policy. This divide is particu-
larly evident in MLB. See MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL (2003) (analyzing the differences
between "small market" and "large market" teams in MLB); Lock, supra note 160, at 406 (ob-
serving that it can be difficult for "smaller market" teams in all sports, such as those located in
Green Bay and Kansas City, to compete with teams from larger markets for free agents); Brian
Kamenetzky, Talking With: Mitch Kupchak, Lakers GM (Part I), LAKERS BLOG, http://
lakersblog.latimes.com/lakersblog/2005/12/talking-with-mi I.html (noting that the same limita-
tions exist for "small market" NBA franchises).
188. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 937 (1999) (finding that leagues institute salary caps to lower player
salaries).
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cost of resources low. Copperweld must require more of a unity of economic
interest than this. 8 9
2. The Economic Realities of Professional Sports Leagues
Make Single Entity Status for Labor Disputes Improper
Even if teams had a unity of interest in labor disputes, single entity
status for leagues in labor disputes could injure players.' 9 The history of
professional sports leagues' labor practices points against finding single en-
tity status in labor disputes. Team owners have implemented unilateral,
abusive labor practices without consulting the player unions. Perhaps the
most notorious instance of such unilateral action occurred in the mid-1980s,
when MLB owners colluded to drive down player salaries.'9g The owners
agreed not to bid on other teams' free agent players or to pay exorbitant
salaries to their own players. 92 Consequently, salary increases took a dra-
matic plunge between 1986 and 1990.' 9' While the owners eventually agreed
to a $280 million settlement with players,' 94 the incident nevertheless illus-
trates the danger of granting professional sports leagues universal single
entity protection in labor matters.
Professional baseball is not the only sport to experience such abuses by
ownership. Mackey 195 involved the unilateral imposition of the "Rozelle
Rule" on NFL players. 96 Furthermore, in McNeil, NFL players contested the
league's unilateral implementation of a plan eliminating severance benefits
and discontinuing the player retirement system. 97 While these incidents of
labor abuse are not particularly relevant under a strict antitrust analysis, they
illustrate the importance of giving professional athletes the protections of
labor law in their dealings with the leagues. Allowing a single entity defense
to trump the application of labor law would be inappropriate.
Although circuit courts have refused to permit the single entity status in
labor disputes involving professional sports leagues, 98 the simple bifurcated
classification scheme proposed in this Note offers a better and more consis-
tent approach than the case-by-case approach these courts used. Granting
189. See Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that sports leagues might not properly be considered single entities in labor disputes).
190. See Jordan, supra note 14, at 248 (finding that permitting the single entity defense in
labor matters could "be detrimental to the players").
191. Murray Chass, With No Ceremony, Collusion Agreement Is Reached, N.Y IMES, Dec.




195. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
196. See text accompanying supra note 162.
197. McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 876 (D. Minn. 1992).
198. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
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professional sports leagues single entity protection in labor disputes would
run contrary to Supreme Court precedent and would jeopardize players'
ability to enforce their rights under current labor law doctrine. These con-
siderations compel the categorical approach advocated in this Note and
render the current case-by-case approach unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt a general classification scheme for determining
whether to permit the single entity status defense by professional sports
leagues. This approach extends upon the Seventh Circuit's suggestion in
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n
that professional sports leagues' single entity status must be determined on a
case-by-case basis. First, courts should generally presume that professional
sports leagues are single entities in matters involving nonlabor policy, ac-
cording to the reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in Copperweld.
Although a unity of interest exists among league franchises in nonlabor mat-
ters, most courts have misapplied Copperweld and its progeny in ruling that
leagues are not single entities. Second, courts should create an exception to
this general classification scheme by disallowing the single entity defense in
labor disputes between players and leagues. Franchises lack a unity of inter-
est in such matters, and the existing judicial balance between antitrust and
labor law serves as a sufficient framework to adjudicate these cases. Conse-
quently, courts should reject the majority rule and adopt the proposed
classification scheme to settle future antitrust challenges to professional
sports leagues.
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